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Abstract
After having reconstructed a minimal biological characterisation of species, we 
endorse an “empirical approach” based on the idea that it is the peculiar evolutionary 
history of the species at issue—its peculiar origination process, its peculiar metap-
opulation structure and the peculiar mixture and strength of homeostatic processes 
vis à vis heterostatic ones—that determine species’ identity at a time and through 
time. We then explore the consequences of the acceptance of the empirical approach 
in settling the individuals versus kinds dispute. In particular, while conceptual argu-
ments have been proposed to show that species can be equally treated as individuals 
and kinds because mereology’s and set-theory’s languages are inter-translatable, we 
advance instead a causal argument to sustain the claim that each species is both a 
kind (i.e., a class whose members share some properties included in a cluster) and 
an individual (i.e., a whole made of parts).
Keywords Biological species · HPC kinds · Species-individuals
1  Sexual species from a biological point of view
A longstanding disagreement about what species are persists. A glance at the litera-
ture on the so-called “species problem” reveals that more than twenty concepts of 
species have been, and still are, employed (Stamos 2003; Wilkins 2009; Richards 
2010; Ereshefsky 2010). A way to overcome this disagreement is to make reference 
to the distinction between a very general species concept (capturing what all species 
concepts have in common) and diferent operational criteria (de Queiroz 2005a, b, 
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2007) or standards of application (LaPorte 2007).1 For instance, de Queiroz argues 
that a general concept of species can be singled out because “…virtually all contem-
porary deinitions of the species category are based on a common general concept of 
species: the concept of species as (segments of) metapopulation lineages” (de Quei-
roz 2005a: p. 6602). According to this view, to be segments of separately evolving 
metapopulation lineages is the only essential property for being a species. All the 
other properties identiied by species concepts are contingent in the sense that they 
not only are typically acquired at diferent times during the speciation process (e.g., 
two lineages can become phenotypically distinguishable before developing repro-
ductive barriers), but also in the sense that they might or might not be acquired dur-
ing the course of the history of the metapopulation lineage. Making mainly refer-
ence to de Queiroz’ version of the general species concept, the question to which our 
contribution tries to give an answer is twofold: irst, what follows from endorsing a 
general species concept concerning the identity of species taxa (i.e., their criteria of 
diachronic and synchronic identity)? And, secondly, what is their metaphysical sta-
tus (i.e., which kind of entities they are)?
In order to answer the above questions, we irstly need to examine the concept of 
metapopulation and the related concept of Mendelian population more closely.
Metapopulation structure and dynamics, depending on the actual historical and 
geographical relations among the species subpopulations, play a fundamental role 
in determining species’ identity. According to Levins (1970), who irstly introduced 
the term, a metapopulation consists of several spatially discrete local populations 
connected through migration and recolonization. The cohesiveness of the metapopu-
lation as well as its vulnerability to extinction depends on its structure and dynam-
ics (i.e., the size and interactions between the constituent populations) which varies 
from species to species.
The components of metapopulations are Mendelian populations. The concept of 
Mendelian population was originally elaborated by Wright (1931) and Dobzhansky. 
The latter deined a Mendelian population as a reproductive community of sexual 
and cross-fertilizing individuals sharing a common gene pool (Dobzhansky 1950: 
p. 405). Two features of Mendelian populations should be highlighted. Firstly, the 
attainment of reproductive isolation between genetically diverging populations is 
“the essence of biological speciation” (Dobzhansky 1950: p. 415). Secondly, the ori-
gin and maintenance of isolating mechanisms are two diferent processes, the irst 
leading to divergence of lineages, the second to the maintenance of the species’ gene 
pool (Mayr 1988: p. 433).
It might be tempting to identify species with gene pools (Ridley 2004: p. 345). 
But this identiication is problematic. Stamos (2003: p. 195), for instance, argues 
that if a species “literally is a protected gene pool”, then it also cannot “literally be” 
a group of interbreeding natural populations, on pain of contradiction. Additionally, 
1 Even though the general species concept is quite agreed upon when species of sexually reproducing 
organisms are at stake, its applicability to asexual species has been questioned (see for instance Doolit-
tle and Zhaxybayeva 2009; and see Samadi and Barberousse 2006 for a possible way to overcome this 
problem).
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identifying species with gene pools would imply a very strong reductionist position 
at odds with the metapopulational approach, which makes reference to interactions 
among populations, such as migration and colonization, without reducing them at 
the genetic level. Accordingly, we prefer to speak of characterization rather than 
identification. Moreover, we would not like to dismiss, in principle, the possibil-
ity that both phenotypic properties and non-genetically inherited properties might 
be relevant for species characterisation. Concerning phenotypic properties, con-
sider the following example. Seasonal polyphenism (either/or phenotypes elicited 
by environmental induction, e.g., temperature) in many butterly species can lead to 
ixation of alternative phenotypes in geographically isolated populations. The pat-
tern of evolution is irst the production of alternative phenotypes with same genetic 
basis by developmental plasticity and then reproductive isolation, causing speciation 
(West-Eberhard 2003, p. 532). In this case, characteristic phenotypes of species are 
relevant for speciation. Concerning non-genetically inherited properties, it has been 
argued that, for instance, epigenetic inheritance may be important for adaptation, 
especially when the available genetic variation is scarce, because it might enable 
survival in dynamic environments (e.g., climate change efects) before genetic adap-
tation evolves (Burggren 2016). If so, then non-genetically inherited properties may 
guarantee the persistence over time of a species.
For these reasons, we propose to replace the gene pool concept with the more 
comprehensive concept of gene-phene pool. Mayr (1970: p. 417) deined the gene 
pool as “The totality of the genes of a given population existing at a given time.” 
Analogously, we deine the concept of gene-phene pool as the totality of the genetic 
and phenotypic properties of a given population or metapopulation existing at a 
given time.2 The concept of gene-phene pool provides a genetic and phenotypic 
characterization of sexual species that complements the ecological characterization 
provided by the metapopulation concept. Importantly, notice that the metapopula-
tion structure and dynamics (i.e., the size and migration and colonization patterns of 
the populations that make up the metapopulation) co-determine the nature and the 
formation of the gene-phene pool of the species (e.g., a migration from one popu-
lation to another population of the same metapopulation can be a means through 
which gene low occurs in the metapopulation).
To sum up, despite the multiplicity of species concepts, a minimal characterisa-
tion on what sexually reproducing species are can be pointed out:
(MC) Species of sexually reproducing organisms are segments of metapopula-
tion lineages whose constituents are Mendelian populations characterized by 
their own gene-phene pool.
2 It is important to emphasise that the concepts of gene pool and gene-phene pool could be deined by 
taking into consideration the extant organisms of the species—like Mayr does—or by taking into account 
all its past, present and future members. This latter characterization clearly shows the indeiniteness of 
the concepts of gene pool and gene-phene pool. Furthermore, it is also important to note that, unlike 
Mayr, we prefer to use the term “genetic property” in order to deine the concept of gene-phene pool; the 
reason is that this latter term is more general and neutral as it might also refer to sequences of DNA with 
not yet known functional role in development.
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Three clariications are in order. First, whether the populations of a metapopulation 
are Mendelian populations or not is an open empirical issue (E.O. Wilson 1975: p. 
51). Here, for simplicity, we assume that all the populations in a segment of a meta-
population lineage are Mendelian populations. Second, it is tempting to merge the 
two concepts of metapopulation and Mendelian population—which are in fact very 
close—and claim that a species is the largest Mendelian population, as Dobzhansky 
did (1950: p. 406). We prefer to maintain the concepts separated. There are cases in 
which as a matter of fact a species is a Mendelian population without being a meta-
population: think of the only extant population of a critically endangered species 
localised in a small territory; it is highly likely that, in the past, this species exhib-
ited a metapopulation structure (i.e., being constituted of geographically distributed 
Mendelian populations) and that its present status is the result of its past metapopu-
lation dynamics. So, in order to be able to account for past metapopulation dynamics 
that have played a fundamental role in determining the identity of a species, it is 
methodologically useful to keep the concepts separated. Third, it should be noted 
that the minimal characterization sketched provides a two-level deinition making 
reference, on the one hand, to the genetic and phenotypic level (through the concept 
of gene-phene pool) and, on the other hand, to the ecological level (through the con-
cept of metapopulation). Whether the two levels could be reduced to each other is an 
issue we are not going to consider in this article.
2  The identity of species
Given the minimal characterisation of species articulated in the previous section, we 
can proceed to answer the irst part of our twofold metaphysical question concern-
ing species’ identity. We suggest that the identity of a species is determined by the 
limits of the relevant metapopulation lineage segment and the relative cohesiveness 
of its gene-phene pool. As it will become clear, we do not endorse the view that it 
will inevitably be possible to clearly determine the limits of the segment and the 
level of cohesiveness required to be a species. Nonetheless, in principle the determi-
nation of the limits of the segment is possible by making reference to the nature of 
the relevant speciation process, while the determination of relative cohesiveness of 
the gene-phene pool is possible by making reference to the metapopulation dynam-
ics and the biological processes producing and maintaining lineage cohesiveness or, 
conversely, generating divergence among lineages. It is for this reason that the con-
cepts of Mendelian population characterized in terms of gene-phene pool and meta-
population are useful epistemological tools to answer the identity question.
The MC suggests that only by knowing the speciation process, the peculiar meta-
population dynamics and the distinctive gene-phene pool it becomes possible to rec-
ognize a particular segment of a lineage as a species and, furthermore, as that par-
ticular species. This is the core message of the empirical approach we endorse. Since 
the speciation process, the metapopulation dynamics and the distinctive gene-phene 
pool difer in each species case, every single species taxon should be considered as 
an entity on its own. In order to show this, consider a species with its own metapop-
ulation structure. Each species underwent its peculiar speciation process, has its own 
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peculiar history and is characterised by its unique metapopulation structure (i.e., a 
given sequences of generations of Mendelian populations over time) and dynam-
ics (migrations and colonisations). Moreover, the ties that keep together, on the one 
hand, the members of Mendelian populations and, on the other hand, the Mendelian 
populations of the metapopulation, can be of diferent type in diferent species. For 
instance, the members of one species might be kept phenotypically homogeneous 
by stabilising selection while the members of another might be kept phenotypically 
homogeneous by the curtailment of mutation through processes enhancing genomic 
stability (e.g., DNA editing) or by developmental homeostasis (i.e., a process that 
canalises the development of the organisms of the species). Additionally, the devel-
opmental and evolutionary processes keeping together the members of Mendelian 
populations as well as the Mendelian populations of the metapopulation may also 
display diferent strengths at diferent times of a species life. For instance, gene con-
servation through stabilising selection might be stronger in diferent phases of the 
life of the species (see Sect. 3.3).
In our view, each sexual species is thus identiied, irst, by its peculiar speciation 
process; second, by the speciic combination of the types of processes maintaining 
its cohesion (see Sect. 3.2); and third, by the speciic strength of such maintenance 
processes (see Sect. 3.3). Accordingly, we propose that a species’ identity is deter-
mined by its integrating principle (Colless 2006), which is constituted by two sorts 
of processes:
 (i) Origination processes, i.e., the kind of processes through which the species 
originated or, put in other words, that allow us to identify the limits of the 
metapopulation lineage segment at issue;
 (ii) Homeostasis processes, i.e., the processes maintaining lineage cohesiveness 
or, in other words, in virtue of which a species persists over time, in spite of 
the changes it undergoes, as one and the same species.
Given the contingency of the historical process a species undergoes (represented 
by, e.g., its geographical separation, its history of mutation, its metapopulation 
dynamics), it seems clear that every species has a peculiar history that leads in pecu-
liar ways (i.e., through the causal action of a peculiar mixture of evolutionary pro-
cesses) to the formation and maintenance of its distinctive gene-phene pool.
3  Sexual species from a metaphysical point of view
The perspective sketched so far takes as departure point the general concept of spe-
cies put forward by de Queiroz, i.e., a deinition of the species category, and then—
adopting the empirical stance suggested by the MC —moves to consider species 
taxa and their identity conditions. We would now like to argue that this empirical 
approach may help in settling the vexata quaestio whether species taxa should be 
conceived as individuals (SAI) or as kinds, more speciically as a peculiar sort of 
natural kinds deined on the basis of homeostatic property clusters (HPC), answer-
ing the second part of the twofold metaphysical question articulated in Sect. 1. De 
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Queiroz (1999: p. 67 f.) pointed out that the general species concept is compat-
ible with conceptualizing species as either individuals or classes. We shall defend 
a stronger metaphysical claim, namely, that species are individuals and kinds at 
the same time.3 More speciically, we shall argue that the fact that species are indi-
viduals and kinds at the same time causally follows from the minimal characteriza-
tion given above. Our argument proceeds as follows. In Sect. 3.1 we illustrate the 
main conceptual arguments that have been proposed to show that species can be 
equally treated as individuals and as kinds. These arguments are typically based on 
the inter-translatability of the two respective languages (i.e., mereology’s and set-
theory’s languages). In Sect. 3.2, we take things a step further by arguing that the 
issue concerning the metaphysical status of biological species is not to be solved by 
uncovering whether the relationships between individual organisms and the species 
they belong to are set-theoretical or rather mereological, but by understanding their 
biological nature. Finally, in Sect. 3.3 we shall highlight that, as we have anticipated 
in Sect.  2, species’ identity through time also depends on the strength of homeo-
static processes. In fact, homeostatic processes maintaining species integrity (i.e., 
the integrity of its gene-phene pool) clash with the processes creating (heterogenic) 
and maintaining (heterostatic) genetic and phenotypic variation (Ereshefsky and 
Matthen 2005). In case the latter prevail, the integrity of the species might be com-
promised, possibly leading to speciation.
3.1  SAI versus HPC
According to SAIsts (Ghiselin 1974; Hull 1978; Eldredge and Gould 1972; Brogaard 
2004)4 species taxa are to be treated as spatio-temporally localized individuals, 
made up of parts (i.e., organisms) related by descent. The relation between organ-
isms, populations and species taxa would then be construed as a part-whole rela-
tion (i.e., a mereological relation) instead of a class-membership relation (i.e., a set-
theoretical relation), thus avoiding—at least according to Ghiselin (1974)—intrinsic 
essentialism. It should be noted that there are two prima facie incompatible ways to 
characterise the SAI thesis. SAI might be seen as (a) a mereological thesis according 
to which species are spatio-temporally localized individuals (concrete particulars) 
made up of causally related parts (i.e., organisms). An advocate of this version of 
SAI is Ghiselin (1974: p. 536), who claims of taking the term “individual” in its 
logical sense—i.e., “not a synonym for ‘organism’”—but rather as merely designat-
ing concrete particulars as opposed to abstract entities such as sets or classes. Oth-
erwise, SAI might be characterised as (b) the thesis that species are “organismal” in 
the sense of displaying organism-like properties such as a certain level of functional 
integration. Hull (1976, 1978) sometimes seems to endorse this version of SAI: 
“they [species] possess all the characteristics of individuals—that is, if organisms 
are taken to be paradigm individuals” (Hull 1976, p. 174). In this article, we shall 
4 The historical roots of the thesis are much older, going back at least to Bufon (Gayon 1996).
3 de Queiroz (1995) admits the same possibility, on the basis of mainly semantic considerations.
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consider the mereological thesis as our main target. Notice, however, that the two 
theses are diferent but not incompatible. One way to understand the relationships 
between these two characterisations is through genidentity (Hull 1992). Genidentity 
(see below in this section) is in this sense both a mereological relationship and an 
account of organismality. In the irst sense, organisms are the states of the biological 
trajectory of the genealogical lineage, while in the second sense species are cohesive 
units of organisms analogous to the cohesive units of cells constituting multicellular 
organisms.
In our view, (b) might be seen as a particular case of (a): under certain conditions, 
the causal relations connecting the parts of a species might become tighter and being 
of the relevant type as to consider a certain species (or a temporal part of it) as an 
organism-like entity. If organismality is a matter of degree and has to do with the 
balance between cooperation and competition, when competition among the parts of 
a species is higher than cooperation, the species will be less organism-like, and vice 
versa (Queller and Strassman 2009).
The major rival of the individuality view is HPC (endorsed in diferent versions 
by authors like Boyd 1999; Wilson et al. 2007; Brigandt 2009).5 The core idea of 
the HPC view is that species are to be treated as natural kinds whose members share 
some of the properties included in a cluster, or a “family” (Boyd 1999: p. 143) of 
properties exhibiting some degree of correlation (i.e., typically co-instantiation). 
Each species member possesses several of these properties, though usually not all 
of them, and none of them must necessarily be shared by all the members of the 
kind (thus overcoming the problems of traditional essentialism).6 Moreover, unlike 
traditional kinds, HPC kinds can account for the fact that a species is a historical 
entity by recognizing historical relations (e.g., the relation of descent) as one type 
of homeostatic mechanism at the basis of the clustering.7 The family of properties is 
indeed “contingently clustered in nature” (Boyd 1999: p. 143) in the sense that these 
phenotypic or genetic features co-occur in an important number of cases in virtue of 
underlying causal processes (i.e., homeostatic processes) that tend to maintain their 
co-occurring presence.8
A third metaphysical position concerning specieshood is worth mentioning for 
its closeness to that hereby defended, namely that species are historical entities. 
5 An alternative account taking Boyd’s HPC view as a departure point has been recently ofered by 
Slater (2013, 2015), who suggests replacing the notion of homeostatic property clusters with the notion 
of stable property clusters (SPC).
6 Whether all the extant (or even past and future) organisms of a species actually share a set of intrinsic 
properties remains an open empirical issue that cannot be settled philosophically (Devitt 2008; Barker 
2010).
7 We characterise a cluster in terms of intrinsic and relational properties. Wilson et al. 2007 argue that 
a cluster consists of both kinds of properties for the reason that “… the features that promote cohesion 
within a species [i.e., that keep the cluster homeostatic] are typically relational properties of conspecif-
ics….” Our argument does not depend on privileging relational over intrinsic properties.
8 It is interesting to note that no deinite list of homeostatic mechanisms has been provided. In our opin-
ion, the reason for this omission is simply that homeostasis is species-dependent: the homeostatic mecha-
nisms at play depend on the peculiar speciation process and metapopulation structure and dynamics and 
thus may vary over time and/or space.
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According to Ereshefsky (2014: p. 714), a species’ identity “is not determined by its 
intrinsic properties or its origin, but by its unique evolutionary path”. A similar view 
was already defended by Hull (1992), who argued that genidentity is the only avail-
able criterion of individuality for supra-organismal aggregates such as species. The 
genidentity criterion can be characterised as the thesis that an object can be indi-
viduated through time not by retention of intrinsic properties but because of its con-
tinuous historical relationship to its previous states in the context of its life history 
trajectory. Genidentity is thus a historical relation purely characterisable in terms of 
the causal relationship between the various life history states of the object. From this 
perspective, it follows that the organisms constituting a species do not belong to it 
because they share intrinsic properties. Thus, the historical identity of a species can 
only be grounded on its unique evolutionary origin and on the phylogenetic relation-
ship that its constituent organisms have with such origin as spatio-temporal parts of 
that genealogical nexus (i.e., a genidentity relationship). Thus, Hull’s and Ereshef-
sky’s positions are similar in the sense that both consider species as path-dependent 
historical entities, while they signiicantly difer because species’ origin is not taken 
as part of the identity criterion by Ereshefsky. Unlike Ereshefsky, we shall consider 
the biological nature of the origination process as a crucial ingredient for the iden-
tity of species.
HPC and SAI have usually been presented by their respective supporters as onto-
logically incompatible. For instance, in reviewing Dupré’s (1995) book, Wilson 
(1996: p. 310) pointed at the fact that it is “an absurdity” to say “that one and the 
same thing is a natural kind and an individual” since “individuals and kinds belong 
to fundamentally diferent ontological categories”.
Wilson’s view is not universally shared. In fact, the supposed ontological incom-
patibility between kinds and individuals has been treated by many authors with a 
certain dose of scepticism. Some have argued that the issue matters more to phi-
losophers rather than to biologists (Assis and Brigandt 2009), and others have raised 
doubts concerning its signiicance. Hull himself, in the conclusion of his paper on 
SAI (Hull 1976), mentioned that “perhaps the distinction between individuals and 
classes is too crude”, and Boyd (1999: p. 162 f.) suspected that the incompatibility 
issue might have been somehow inlated in the literature. Moreover, Okasha (2002: 
p. 193) claimed “that it is largely a matter of convention whether species are con-
ceptualized as individuals, kinds or historical entities”, echoing Dupré (1995: p. 
43) who wrote that: “in some contexts species are treated as individuals, in others 
as kinds”. The argument usually brought in favour of the consistency between the 
two views may be called “the argument from inter-translatability”: “An organism 
is ‘a part of a species-individual’ on SAI, while the HPC view has to conceptual-
ize this organism as ‘a member of a species-natural-kind’, and translate any talk 
about organisms accordingly (and vice versa for SAI).” (Brigandt 2009: p. 85) This 
argument avoids taking a stance on what species are, both from a metaphysical 
and a biological point of view, efectively considering the issue merely conceptual 
or linguistic: a certain portion of the biological realm can be conceptualized and 
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described in mereological terms as well as in set-theory terms.9 In fact, the main 
diference between the two ways of speaking is that mereology is not committed 
to the existence of abstract entities—such as classes or sets—, while set-theory is 
(this does not mean that mereology is committed to concreta instead: the whole can 
be as concrete as the parts, and the parts can be as abstract as the whole—see Varzi 
2016). But this diference does not seem to play any substantial role in the case of 
biological species. In speaking of species taxa as kinds, what we are interested in 
is not abstract entities but, rather, their concrete members with their properties. For 
instance, by saying that “species evolve” we are not aiming to say that there is an 
abstract entity—a class—that evolves (abstract entities cannot evolve by deinition). 
What we might mean is that, over time, the frequency of a certain phenotype (i.e., a 
property of individual organisms, namely the members of the species at issue) has 
increased or decreased in the population of reference.10 The very same point can be 
expressed in terms of parts (Okasha 2002; LaPorte 2004; Brigandt 2009).
The intertranslatability argument states that the two languages—mereology’s 
and set-theory’s—have an equivalent expressive power or, conversely, that the same 
portion of reality can be equally well described by means of the two diferent lan-
guages. On the contrary, we shall argue that SAI and HPC could be closer than it 
seems at a irst glance also in virtue of biological considerations. In the next section, 
we argue that the empirical approach provides a biological foundation for the inter-
translatability argument. Our argument is not an entirely new one. It is close, under 
some respects, to Rieppel’s (2007, 2009) and LaPorte’s (2004), according to whom 
species are both kinds and individuals: “where there are properties, there are natural 
kinds. … As long as it is admitted that talk about species have causally grounded 
properties, it also has to be admitted that talk about species as individuals can be 
translated into talk about species as natural kinds (LaPorte 2004)” (Rieppel 2007: 
p. 378). But it has two important diferences. First, we do not endorse Rieppel’s 
conclusion that the fact that species are kinds means that they are “single members 
of their own speciic natural kinds”, i.e. “complex wholes (particulars, individuals) 
that instantiate a speciic natural kind” (Rieppel 2007: p. 373), for we see no reason 
in considering each species as a member of its own kind, which would multiply enti-
ties unnecessarily. What we do claim is that each species is both a kind (i.e., a class 
whose members share some properties included in a cluster) and an individual. Of 
course, this implies a conlation of the distinction between kinds and individuals; we 
accept this implication, seeing it as a low price to pay.
9 We use the terms “class” and “set” as synonymous and as intensionally deined.
10 This is called, by Kitcher (1984), “The fallacy of incomplete translation”. Kitcher reconstructs the 
argument in favour of SAI as follows: Sets cannot evolve; species evolve; hence species are not set. In 
the argument, “species evolve” is, according to Kitcher, left untranslated. To complete the translation, we 
need to consider that a species, set-theoretically conceived, is a union of subsets—or stages. A stage is 
the set of organisms belonging to the species which are alive at a given time. Accordingly, the complete 
translation of “species evolve” would be something like: the frequency of the distribution of (genetic 
or genetic plus phenotypic) properties at one stage will difer from the frequency of the distribution of 
(genetic or genetic plus phenotypic) properties at a later stage. Proceeding in this way, Kitcher argues, 
claims about the evolutionary behaviour of species—such as for instance speciation or extinction—may 
be easily expressed in set-theoretical terms.
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Consider that the master argument provided by SAIsts in favour of their view is 
the following: species evolve; abstract entities (such as kinds) are atemporal enti-
ties, thus they cannot evolve; then, species are not kinds. But, as Kitcher (1984) and 
LaPorte (2004) have shown, abstract entities can be made compatible with evolu-
tion once the fallacy of incomplete translation is recognized. The metaphysical dis-
tinction lying behind the argument is that between abstract and concrete entities, 
whereas abstract entities are identiied with sets or classes, and concrete entities 
with individuals or particulars. However, such identiication is questionable: just as 
there might be abstract individuals (such as, for instance, numbers), there might be 
concrete kinds, i.e., either a kind may be identiied with its members or with its 
deining properties, where these properties are understood as concrete particulars 
(i.e., individualized properties).
Moreover, as Reydon (2009) has argued, Rieppel’s reconciliation between kinds 
and individuals is merely an epistemological, not a metaphysical argument. Our 
position is a stronger one: species are at the same time kinds and individuals in a 
metaphysical (and biological) sense, and not only because conceiving them as such 
is required by diferent kinds of biological explanations, or allowed by the inter-
translatability of sets-talk and part-whole talk. The fact that species taxa are both 
kinds and individuals is a consequence—so we argue—of the way in which some 
lineage segments originate, evolve, and become extinct.
3.2  A causal argument for compatibility
The empirical approach addresses the question concerning the metaphysical sta-
tus of species taxa in these terms: each species is at the same time an individual 
and a kind individuated by its characteristic origination process, its characteristic 
gene-phene pool and its characteristic metapopulation structure and dynamics. The 
twofold metaphysical status of species taxa depends on this biological characteriza-
tion, rather than on purely linguistic or conceptual considerations. The reason is that 
organisms participate in species-speciic biological processes, and this participation, 
as well as those processes, is what makes them both parts of wholes and members of 
classes. This participation is causally primary since, without it, there would simply 
be no species at all, and hence it should inform the metaphysical analysis of species 
in so far as they are biological entities. Certain species-speciic causal relations hold 
among the organisms that make a species (e.g., relations of descent or reproduction), 
as well as between those organisms and the species (e.g., relations of part-hood or 
membership). When those relations hold, an entity which is at the same time an 
individual and a kind is what we are dealing with. For instance, consider common 
descent. Organism a is part of the whole/species S when it is genealogically related 
to another organism b, where b is a recognised part of S; and, at the very same time, 
that same organism a is a member of class/species S because it shares n properties 
of the cluster C characterising S with b, where b is a recognised member of S. Now 
note that this is the twofold outcome of one and the same process that emphasises 
diferent causal relationships, i.e., being genealogically related and sharing genetic 
and phenotypic properties. Yet, ultimately, both relationships involve material 
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inheritance: common descent is both the causal process linking part a and part b 
of S and the causal process making member a genetically and phenotypically simi-
lar to member b. To put it in other words: if species are biological entities, then an 
organism a is a part of individual/whole S because it stands in a particular biological 
relationship with S which happens to be mereological. Equally, if organism a is a 
member of class S, it is because it stands in a particular biological relationship with 
S which happens to be set-theoretical. Thus, mereological and set-theoretical rela-
tions should be, in the case of things like biological species, interpreted biologically 
because they are biologically realised.
The putative incompatibility between the individuality and HPC kind theses 
highlighted in Sect. 3.1 stems from the fact that, prima facie, they seem to identify 
species’ part-hood and membership conditions diferently. In the case of the indi-
viduality thesis, in order to characterise part-hood conditions explicit reference to 
the causal relations between parts is needed. Conversely, in the case of the HPC kind 
thesis, the characterisation of membership conditions makes reference to the genetic 
and phenotypic properties of the relevant cluster (see footnote 8). But this diference 
is spurious. In fact, causally speaking the two theses both make reference to speciic 
causal relations and interactions between organisms in terms of their participation 
in causal processes. Causally speaking, the individuality thesis claims that an indi-
vidual is a whole made of parts; parts are causally related to other parts because 
they participate in speciic causal processes, where these causal processes make the 
whole individual-like; for instance, a is part of the whole/species-as-individual S if 
it is causally related (e.g., by reproduction or descent) to another part b of S. The 
speciic causal relationship between a and b contributes to make S a cohesive whole. 
In the HPC case, a kind has members and its members are identiied by property 
clusters; members are causally related to other members because they participate in 
homeostatic processes, where these causal processes make the participating mem-
bers genetically and phenotypically similar and the relative species kind-like; for 
instance, a is member of the species-as-HPC-kind S if it shares a subset of the prop-
erties of the cluster C that characterises species S with b.
When a causal approach is endorsed, we can see that the two main putative dif-
ferences between the two views are apparent. The irst is a diference in emphasis: 
while the individuality thesis stresses the causal participation of the organisms of 
the same species in speciic causal processes, the HPC kind thesis might be inter-
preted as stressing the similarity between those organisms; however, their similarity 
is determined by their participation in causal processes, i.e., similarity is the causal 
efect of such participation. To strengthen this point, consider again the metapopu-
lational structure of a species. If you look at the sequence of Mendelian populations 
through time, it is clear that what keeps together the successive generations of popu-
lations are causal relations such as reproduction and descent. But if you look at the 
metapopulation at time t (i.e., if you consider just one generation), what catches the 
eye is the similarity among the organisms that compose the species (since gene low 
and descent are inter-generational processes). The second apparent diference stems 
from the fact that certain causal processes might render a species individual-like 
while others might make it kind-like. But even in this case the diference is spurious. 
What needs to be understood is the nature of the causal relations and interactions 
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between the organisms of a lineage in terms of their participation in causal pro-
cesses. It is highly probable that the homeostatic processes keeping the members 
of species genetically and phenotypically homogeneous are diferent (e.g., develop-
mental and genetic homeostasis in the case of one species and genetic drift, direc-
tional selection and adaptive introgression in the case of another); accordingly, dif-
ferent species may be individual-like and kind-like in virtue of diferent processes. 
This species-speciicity and uniqueness was already highlighted by Mayr (1963) 
when referring to “species-speciic homeostatic mechanisms”. Our point is that it is 
not possible that a single species with a speciic origin, life history, metapopulation 
structure and gene-phene pool is individual-like because of the causal contribution 
of a set of biological processes x and kind-like because of the causal contribution of 
a diferent set of biological processes y. We here argue that if these causal processes 
render the species individual-like, then they also render it HPC-kind-like and vice 
versa. On the one hand, the various parts of a species are kept together tightly by 
means of their causal relations and through their participation in speciic biologi-
cal processes that make the whole cohesive, integrated and individual-like. On the 
other hand, the cluster of co-occurring genetic and phenotypic properties partially 
shared by the members of the species-as-kind is kept together as a homeostatic clus-
ter through the action of the very same speciic biological processes.
Ultimately, we argue that, because the same processes cause a species to be both 
individual-like and kind-like, that entity is both an individual and a kind. The con-
trast between SAI and HPC can then be read as occurring at an epistemological 
rather than at an ontological level. As a matter of fact, SAI and HPC look at the 
same biological reality from two alternative perspectives, i.e., they are describing 
two sides of the same coin: the cohesiveness of biological species as wholes and the 
compactness of their gene-phene pools. For instance, processes like developmen-
tal and genetic homeostasis, made possible by reproduction, equally make a species 
individual-like and kind-like at the same time. Some advocates of the individuality 
thesis (e.g. Hull 1978; Gould 2002: chapter 8) argued that these homeostatic pro-
cesses render the species cohesive like an individual (and unlike a kind). But also 
note that the efect of these processes is homeostatic in the sense that they main-
tain the species’ gene-phene pool stable; that is, the processes rendering the species 
a cohesive individual are also those maintaining the stability of its distinctive and 
characterising HPC. The reason is obvious: developmental homeostasis canalises 
the development of the organisms of the species by making them phenotypically 
uniform, while genetic homeostasis (i.e., stabilising selection eliminating less it 
hybrids and “deviant” organisms) has an equivalent genetic efect.
The inter-translatability argument states that individual-talk and kind-talk are 
inter-translatable. The argument from causality we have here proposed shows that 
the two metaphysical views are consistent on the basis of making reference to the 
same biological processes. Thus, as far as sexual species are concerned, the argu-
ment from causality supports the inter-translatability argument that each species can 
be treated as both an individual and as an HPC kind on the basis of the metaphysi-
cal thesis that each species is, at the same time, an individual and an HPC kind. 
We therefore argue that there is a fact of the matter concerning the question of the 
metaphysical status of sexual species: it is not a matter of convention to treat sexual 
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species as individuals or as kinds, but it is rather a matter of looking at the causal 
processes determining species’ identity.
3.3  Individuality and kindness are a matter of degree
In this section we characterize our position in more detail and evaluate the implied 
corollary that both individuality and kindness may come in degrees. In Sect. 2 we 
observed that there might be a diference not only in the kind of homeostatic pro-
cesses at play, but also in the homeostatic strength of the processes. As a conse-
quence of this, a species might be more individual-like (i.e., a more or less cohesive 
whole) and more kind-like (i.e., a more “natural” cluster sensu Boyd) at time t and 
less at (past or future) time tn and vice versa. The reason (also highlighted by Slater 
2015: p. 393) is the following. Evolutionary processes such as, for instance, selec-
tion and drift can be homogenizing forces in speciic circumstances, but not gener-
ally. It is again a contingent matter depending on the peculiar history and present 
status of the metapopulation whether evolutionary processes will have a homogeniz-
ing rather than a disruptive efect. It is useful to think of this dynamic as a clash 
between the homeostatic processes that maintain species integrity (i.e., its genetic 
and phenotypic uniformity) and the processes creating (heterogenic) and maintain-
ing (heterostatic) genetic and phenotypic variation. Thus, we suggest that individu-
ality and kindness come in degrees, depending on the strength of homeostasis and 
on the prevalence of homeostasis vis à vis heterostasis.
In order to show this, let us consider an example concerning our species. Mayr 
argued that species’ homeostasis is often characterized by inertia:
… owing to the hundreds or thousands of generations that have undergone pre-
ceding selection, a natural population will be close to the optimal genotype… 
All the mutations of which this genotype is capable and that could lead to an 
improvement of this standard phenotype have already been incorporated in 
previous generations. (Mayr 2001: 50)
However, homeostatic inertia can be eclipsed. For instance, consider the evolution of 
lactose tolerance. In this case, mutation acts as a heterogenic process: several muta-
tions associated with the expression of the lactase gene allowing humans to process 
lactose occurred in diferent geographic areas in the last 10.000 years or so (Tishkof 
et al. 2007). Given the existence of heterogenesis, with what frequency does heter-
ostasis happen? The chief reason for thinking that heterogenesis does not usually 
translate into stable polymorphisms is that selection is assumed to mostly ix one 
variant, i.e., to be stabilising (West-Eberhard 2003: p. 6 f.). But the frequency of 
stabilising selection compared to other forms of selection depends on the constancy 
of the developmental and evolutionary environments in which the species lives. As 
a matter of fact, in the case of lactose tolerance, directional selection has been act-
ing as a heterostatic process: the lactose tolerance mutations have spread, partially 
disrupting the homeostatic inertia of our species, with a signiicant subpopulation of 
contemporary humans lactose tolerant. The present human dimorphism exhibits the 
underlying genetic variation at the metapopulation level and the evolution of lactose 
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tolerance that is currently taking place. Obviously, we are not here arguing that this 
is an impending case of sympatric speciation with the lactose-tolerant and intolerant 
human populations slowly diversifying and separating as distinct lineages. What we 
claim is rather that the maintenance of the present dimorphism or the eventual ixa-
tion of the lactose tolerant phenotype (in one of its known genetic variants or others) 
will depend on the present and future status of the human metapopulation and the 
relative strength of diferent evolutionary forces. In a scenario in which, in difer-
ent ecological and social settings, the lactose tolerant and lactose intolerant traits 
maintain itness-enhancing properties (respectively an environment where domesti-
cated cattle are abundant, milk extraction techniques are suiciently reined etc. vs. 
an environment with increasing availability of milk substitutes, not enough cattle 
to meet population needs etc.) disruptive selection might act as a heterostatic force. 
Conversely, given a change in this setting (e.g., the increasing itness of the lactose 
tolerant phenotype due, for instance, to the rising importance of milk and dairy con-
sumption on a planet devastated by underproduction of alternative food resources, or 
enhanced immunity to zoonotic diseases transmitted by cattle), directional selection 
might act as a homeostatic force.
Besides this speculation, the example shows that homeostasis is counterbal-
anced by a number of context-relative and species-speciic heterogenic and hetero-
static forces and that the prevalence of these forces determines the conditions for 
speciation. In particular, the example shows that the existence of polymorphisms 
is an important—though per se insuicient—condition for sympatric speciation. It 
is insuicient because a heterostatic force must be at play to disrupt homeostasis 
and actually diversify the lineage. When polymorphisms are available, for instance, 
disruptive selection can act as a heterostatic force. Indeed, as Mallet (1995: p. 299) 
argued, “To understand speciation, we need to understand when disruptive selection 
can outweigh gene low between populations.” Ultimately, it is a contingent matter 
depending on the peculiar history and present status of a species whether speciic 
developmental and evolutionary processes will have a homogenizing rather than a 
disruptive efect.
The example above is also meant to show that heterostasis renders simultaneously 
the species less individual-like (by making it less cohesive) and less HPC kind-like 
(by making its distinctive homeostatic cluster less homogeneous). Starting with the 
issue of individuality, the notion of species cohesion might be interpreted, follow-
ing Barker and Wilson (2010, pp. 64–65), in at least two ways: as response cohe-
sion, when its component organisms respond as a unit to some kind of intervention 
(causal interaction among them is not required, they may respond similarly but inde-
pendently), or as integrative cohesion (i.e., when the causal interactions between 
most or all of the organisms make it function as a whole). Barker and Wilson argue 
that, typically, biological species only display the irst kind of cohesion—i.e., by 
responding as a unit to evolutionary pressures—but lack integrative cohesion. Thus, 
according to them, species cannot be considered individuals because, being “gappy” 
entities (for instance in the sense that their members are physically separated), most 
or all species members are unable to causally interact appropriately in order to 
achieve integrative cohesion (for instance, because certain behaviours may preclude 
gene low). At the same time, they admit that “response cohesion comes in degrees”. 
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We suggest the same applies to integrative cohesion, with the consequence that also 
individuality comes in degrees, resulting in species whose individuality is more 
or less “organismal” (recall the distinction between the two formulations of SAI 
sketched in Sect. 3.1).
Consider also that gene low might not be the only means to achieve integrative 
cohesion. At least Eldredge and Gould (1972), Templeton (1989) and Mallet (1995) 
have maintained that species can evolve as cohesive units even in the absence of sig-
niicant gene low. For instance:
The coherence of a species, therefore, is not maintained by interaction among 
its members (gene low). It emerges, rather, as an historical consequence of the 
species’ origin as a peripherally isolated population that acquired its power-
ful homeostatic system … if … stability is an inherent property both of indi-
vidual development and the genetic structure of populations, then its power 
is immeasurably enhanced, for the basic property of homeostatic systems, of 
steady states, is that they resist change by self-regulation. (Eldredge and Gould 
1972: 114)11
The origination process of our species provides an illustration of the Eldredge’s and 
Gould’s point. An accredited hypothesis postulates an allopatric cladogenetic sce-
nario whereby an estimated population of 10.000 organisms represented the ances-
tral population of H. sapiens (Relethford 2008). Supposing that ancestral humans 
were tightly interacting so as to constitute an organism-like functional system, this 
might represent a case of integrative cohesion whereby all original parts are sui-
ciently interconnected as to constitute a strongly individual-like whole. This putative 
lack of original gappines was then protected by developmental and genetic homeo-
stasis. Thus, whether a species displays integrative cohesion depends on the par-
ticular species and on the particular moment of its history taken into consideration. 
Not every species is gappy, and their gappiness might increase (or decrease) through 
time.
Notice that the cohesion Eldredge and Gould hypothesise would also imply 
genetic and phenotypic uniformity (genetic uniformity is the outcome of genetic 
homeostasis and phenotypic uniformity is the outcome of developmental homeo-
stasis). Secondly, species’ cohesion might change through time, passing from being 
integrative to being merely responsive, or even weaker (and vice versa). This means 
that, passing to the issue of kindness, also genetic and phenotypic homogeneity 
comes in degrees, in parallel with individuality.
HPC-kindness is the result of exactly the same biological conditions we have 
stressed so far: the prevalence of homeostatic, homogenising and cohesive pro-
cesses over heterogenic and heterostatic ones. If the former prevail, the cluster will 
be more tightly knit. We thus suggest that when homeostatic processes prevail over 
heterostatic ones, the species will be concomitantly a whole whose parts are more 
11 It may be objected that the kind of cohesiveness Elredge and Gould are talking about here is respon-
siveness cohesion. However, their reference to a homeostatic system implies the existence of a causal 
interactions among the members of the population beyond gene low.
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cohesive (hence, more organism-like) and a cluster whose characterizing properties 
are more tightly knit (hence, more natural sensu Boyd, as an HPC kind). Conversely, 
when heterostatic processes prevail, the conditions leading to potential speciation 
would emerge. One outcome of the prevalence of heterostatic processes could be 
illustrated by the evolution of our species: migrations out of Africa, interbreeding 
with other hominin species, colonization of various continents, etc. have concomi-
tantly rendered our species an increasingly less cohesive whole and a less pheno-
typically uniform cluster. A diferent outcome of the prevalence of heterostatic pro-
cesses might result in speciation. The prevalence of heterostatic processes might 
have the consequence that the cohesive individual would ultimately cease to exist as 
such (for instance, when it will “become” two individuals), and the cluster would be 
increasingly disjointed and relect increasing multi-modality in phenotypic expres-
sion, until its ultimate disintegration (in the sense that two diferent clusters will 
be eventually needed to characterise two diferent species). For example, the exist-
ence of signiicant polymorphisms (e.g., of non-neutral variants) renders simulta-
neously the species-individual less organism-like (because, for instance, disruptive 
selection might lead to diversiication of the lactose-tolerant and intolerant human 
populations) and its distinctive homeostatic cluster less homogeneous (because, for 
instance, the human metapopulation is characterized by dimorphism concerning lac-
tose tolerance).
It might be objected that in some cases the existence of polymorphisms might 
make the species more organism-like, for example, through the division of labour 
among the parts (think of the diferent castes seen in ant and termite colonies).12 If 
this is the case, then some processes seem to generate a less tightly-knit and more 
disjointed HPC kind while simultaneously generating a more cohesive individual. 
Even though we concede that this might happen, we would also like to stress that 
nonetheless the diferentiated parts display both a certain, general, level of similarity 
and a stronger level of similarity “locally”, that is, between the members of the dif-
ferent castes (i.e., the higher-level parts/members) of the species.
To conclude, at diferent moments of its history, a species might be more an 
individual (i.e., more organism-like) or more natural an HPC kind than at other 
moments. What makes sexual species individuals also concomitantly makes them 
HPC natural kinds. Whether the same holds for asexual species (in case they were 
considered species at all) remains an open question.
4  Conclusion
We have argued that our empirical approach vindicates the ecumenical stance that 
species are at the same time individuals and HPC kinds. The starting point of our 
argument is the general species concept, which captures what all species concepts 
have in common, i.e., that species are segments of metapopulation lineages. We 
then articulated in more detail the concept of metapopulation, ending up with what 
12 We thank a reviewer for raising this objection.
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we called a “minimal characterization” of species. Then, adopting the empirical 
stance that seems to be required by the minimal characterization (namely that only 
by considering the species-speciic origination process, metapopulation dynamics 
and gene-phene pool it is possible to recognize a particular segment of a lineage as 
a species and, furthermore, as that particular species), we have moved to consider 
species taxa and their identity conditions over time. By looking at the biological 
processes that led to the origin of new species, to those impinging on their life histo-
ries, to those afecting their metapopulation dynamics and creating their metapopu-
lation structures and, inally, to the homeostatic and heterostatic processes afect-
ing their history, we believe the metaphysical issue concerning the nature of species 
could also be settled. One possible outcome of our analysis could be that, given the 
uniqueness of the biological processes punctuating every species’ life history, some 
form of ontological pluralism should be endorsed: perhaps some sexual species are 
individuals and others HPC kinds. However, we excluded that outcome on the basis 
of our causal argument: because the biological processes at the basis of the individu-
ality and kindness of a species are the same, what shall be concluded is that species 
taxa are at the same time both individuals and HPC kinds. Being an individual, it is 
identiiable in terms of mereological relationships. Being a kind, it is characterizable 
in terms of an HPC cluster, however formed and maintained.
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